Double Couponing and Retail Pricing in a Couponed Product Category
研究超市双重优惠券政策对制造商优惠券投放和零售商定价的影响，通过博弈模型分析并利用零售价格数据验证结果。
A common practice in many supermarkets is double, and in some cases, triple couponing. Retail managers adopting this policy react emotionally to couponing by manufacturers: They “won't tolerate dumping in this marketplace by manufacturers who run 25 cents coupons elsewhere, but 50 cents coupons [t]here.” How justified are retail managers in their claims? Does it really benefit manufacturers to do this? How is the retail pricing of the category affected by the double-couponing policy? And, what happens to the competing retailer that does not double coupon? The authors provide answers to these questions. They use a game theoretic model to (1) study the effects of double couponing, (2) derive the equilibrium level of couponing by manufacturers, and (3) derive the double-couponing retailer's retail pricing of brands in the category, as well as the pricing of the competing retailer that does not follow the double-couponing policy. The authors then test their results using primary data on retail prices.