内幕交易与期权授予时机:应对共同基金股票抛售(及购买)的行为

Insider Trading and Option Grant Timing in Response to Fire Sales (and Purchases) of Stocks by Mutual Funds

Journal of Accounting Research · 2011
被引 65
人大 AFT50UTD24ABS 4*

中文导读

研究发现,共同基金因资金流入流出导致的股票错误定价,会被公司内部人利用,通过买卖自家股票和调整期权授予时机来获利,同时这些行为也加速了价格回归合理水平。

Abstract

Mutual funds experiencing large outflows (inflows) tend to decrease (expand) their positions, creating downward (upward) price pressure in the stocks held in common by them (Coval and Stafford [2007]). This study shows that corporate insiders exploit the resulting mispricing by buying (selling) their company's stock if it is subject to such fire sales (purchases) by funds. We also show that the likelihood of option grants is greater for stocks that are subject to mutual fund fire sales. Finally, we show that both the insider trading and the option granting activities help speed up the correction of the flow‐driven mispricing. Overall, this study illustrates that insiders enhance personal benefits by trading on their personal account and influencing the timing of option grants in response to mispricing due to flow‐driven fund trading. Moreover, these activities help improve the informational efficiency of stock price.

内幕交易期权授予时机共同基金抛售错误定价