The Dissonance Model of Participative Budgeting: An Empirical Exploration
通过实验发现，当参与者能自由决策并设定难达成的预算时，即使没有绩效奖励，也能提高预算承诺和绩效，基于认知失调理论构建模型。
Participative budgeting has been proposed as a technique which can be used both to enhance participants' attitudes toward the budget and to induce achievement of budgeted objectives. The available evidence, however, seems to indicate that while participation in budgeting enhances attitudes toward the budget and various other attitudes of participants, it does not always result in increased performance or motivation to perform.1 The results of this study indicate that participative budgeting which allowed participants to perceive themselves as having exercised freedom of decision in the setting of difficult-to-achieve budgets yielded both increased commitment toward budget achievement and increased performance, even in the absence of a performance-contingent reward structure. Section 2 contains a brief summary of the related accounting literature. In section 3, I provide an overview of the theory of cognitive dissonance and its application within a model of participative budgeting. Section 4 presents a summary of the experiment, results of postexperimental manipulation checks, and the experimental hypotheses, followed by a discussion of the experimental results (section 5). The last section contains a discussion of the limitations and implications of the results.