Sales of Secondary Shares in SEOs: A Comparison across Top Managers, Other Insiders, and Outsiders
研究了1997至2009年间增发中高管内部人出售股份的信息含量，发现高管出售与市场反应和长期业绩负相关，而其他内部人出售则无关，支持信息不对称和代理理论。
This paper investigates the information content of registered insider sales in the Seasoned Equity Offering (SEO) process from 1997 to 2009. We find that initial market reactions and long‐run post‐issue stock performance are negatively related to C‐level executive insider sales, but unrelated to participation by nonexecutive insiders. We also find significantly lower post‐issue abnormal earnings surprises for SEOs with C‐level executive sales. Overall, the findings are consistent with the predictions of asymmetric information and agency theories.