Legislative Success and Failure and Participation in Rule Making
研究了立法成败与官僚政策制定参与的关系，检验了受监管成本影响方比受益方更积极参与规则制定的假设，以医疗保险支付改革为例发现证据不足。
This article addresses the relationship between legislative success and failure and participation in bureaucratic policy making. It specifically examines the hypothesis that the parties upon which regulations are expected to impose costs participate more extensively in the rule-making process than the expected beneficiaries of regulations do. The analysis focuses on the submission of comments on a regulation, promulgated by the Health Care Financing Administration, that reformed the way in which the Medicare program pays for physician services. The results provide little evidence that physician specialties that expect decreases in payment under the new system submitted more comments than specialties that expect increases in payment. This finding is contrary to expectations drawn from prospect theory, research on benefits, costs, and political participation, and the conventional wisdom on participation in rule making. More broadly, it highlights the need for additional research on the use and influence of participatory instruments, which potentially enhance the extent to which bureaucratic agencies are accountable to elected officials and their constituents