Regulatory Delay and Rulemaking Deadlines
研究了美国行政规则制定中法定截止日期对规则最终确定概率和机构预测准确性的影响，发现截止日期促使机构更可能承诺完成规则，但预测准确性下降，导致监管延迟。
Regulatory delay is one of the most cited problems with US administrative policymaking, and lawmakers frequently impose statutory deadlines on agencies to combat it. Using data on federal rules proposed over a 10-year period, we estimate the impact of statutory deadlines on the probability that proposed rules were finalized as well as their impact on the error with which agencies forecasted when rules would be finalized. We find that agencies were more likely to commit to rule finalization by setting a target date for finalization—and, therefore, that agencies were more likely to finalize a proposed rule—if the proposed rule was associated with a statutory deadline. However, we also find that agency target dates provided less accurate forecasts about the timing of finalization when proposed rules were associated with statutory deadlines. This inaccuracy came in the form of “regulatory delay,” which we define as rules being finalized later than agencies initially forecasted via publicized target dates. This study is the first to operationalize regulatory delay based on a proxy for stakeholder expectations (agency target dates), and it uncovers a potentially significant impact of imposing deadlines on rulemaking.