Why Do Managers Voluntarily Issue Cash Flow Forecasts?
研究管理者自愿发布现金流预测的动机，发现其用于传递现金流好消息、满足投资者需求、限制盈余管理自由度，并在公司年轻或盈利有坏消息时增强可信度。
ABSTRACT We study a relatively recent change in voluntary disclosure practices by management, namely, the issuance of cash flow forecasts. We predict and find that management issues cash flow forecasts to signal good news in cash flow, to meet investor demand for cash flow information, and to precommit to a certain composition of earnings in terms of cash flow versus accruals, thus reducing the degree of freedom in earnings management. Our results also suggest that management discloses good news in cash flow to mitigate the negative impact of bad news in earnings, to lend credibility to good news in earnings, and to signal economic viability when the firm is young. Our finding that management cash flow forecasts primarily convey good news is in contrast to the generally negative nature of management earnings guidance and suggests that different incentives drive firms' disclosure of different financial information.