On the Relationship Between Volume Reaction and Consensus of Investors: Implications for Interpreting Tests of Information Content
探讨公开信息下成交量反应与投资者共识的关系，指出信息不对称与公开信息导致交易的原因不同，为解释信息含量检验提供启示。
* Associate Professor, University of Chicago. I gratefully acknowledge the generous assistance of Nicholas Dopuch and Richard Leftwich in the preparation and editing of this manuscript, as well as comments and suggestions offered by the Ohio State Accounting Colloquium. I also acknowledge earlier correspondence with Nils Hakansson concerning the proof employed in this paper, and Jerold Zimmerman concerning the issue of volume reaction. Any remaining errors are solely my responsibility. [Accepted for publication July 1980.] ' This is somewhat in contrast to discussion of the relationship between volume reaction and information when the information is distributed asymmetrically among investors. Copeland [1976], for example, discusses a sequential information arrival model in which an element of information is disclosed (at no cost) to homogeneous traders one at a time during a trading period. Morse [1979] surveys more recent work on the effect of asymmetrically distributed information. However, information which is distributed asymmetrically is fundamentally different from information which is made publicly available. In the former situation, trading occurs because one group of investors has access to information not available to some other group, whereas in the latter situation, trading occurs despite the fact that all investors come to know the information simultaneously.