The Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Politics of Regulatory Reform: Since Three Mile Island
本文分析美国核监管委员会自1979年三里岛事故后的改革，指出尽管有结构变化，但关键政治和行政问题仍未解决，许多改革可能流于表面。
The present era is one in which regulatory politics and policies are in a state of flux. Recent efforts at regulatory have taken a variety of forms, including relaxation of federal controls on the airline and trucking industries and on oil and natural gas prices. In contrast to most other policy areas, however, recent developments in federal regulation of the nuclear power industry-particularly since the March 1979 accident at Three Mile Island-would seem, at least at first glance, to indicate a trend toward greater regulation rather than less. This paper will attempt to show that while some structural and policy changes have indeed occurred at the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission since 1979, several of the larger administrative and political issues concerning regulation of nuclear power, assessment of the risks of nuclear technology, and the accountability of regulators to elected officials and the public remain unresolved. Moreover, there are signs that many of the changes that have taken place may be more cosmetic than real, and may or may not result in real improvements in the quality of regulatory decision making regarding the nuclear industry in the United States. Even before Three Mile Island (hereafter referred to as TMI), there was no shortage of suggestions for reform of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, created under the 1974 Energy Reorganization Act to take over the old Atomic Energy Commission's responsibility for licensing and regulation of commercial nuclear power plants. After Congress belatedly recognized the potential conflicts of interest involved in vesting the AEC with both promotion and regulation of nuclear power, it was hoped that the new agency would be able to make a fresh start and avoid the mistakes of its predecessor.' In many ways, however, the new NRC was not significantly different from the AEC in its structure or policies. The NRC retained the collegial structure characteristic of the AEC as well as such other independent regulatory commissions as the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). The five NRC commissioners are appointed by the president (who also designates the chairman) with the consent of the Senate for staggered five-year terms, and no more than three of the five may belong to the