SIGNALING IN HIGHER EDUCATION: THE EFFECT OF ACCESS TO ELITE COLLEGES ON CHOICE OF MAJOR
提出一个信号模型，发现进入精英大学机会多的地区，非精英大学中低能力学生选择STEM专业的概率降低2.3-3.7个百分点（16%-25%），为信号传递理论提供了证据。
I propose a model of postsecondary education in which major field of study can be used by individuals to signal productivity to employers. Under this signaling model, I show that geographic areas with high access to elite universities result in fewer science, technology, engineering, and mathematics ( STEM ) majors among lower ability students at nonelite colleges. This is distinct from the prediction of a full information model in which access to elite schools should only affect high ability individuals directly. Using data from the National Center for Education Statistics' Baccalaureate & Beyond survey, I find evidence that is consistent with the signaling model prediction, specifically a 2.3–3.7 percentage point or 16%–25% decrease in the probability of choosing a STEM major among lower ability students in areas with greater access to elite colleges.