Evaluating Novelty: The Role of Panels in the Selection of R&D Projects
基于对一家领先专业服务公司研发项目的多源多方法研究，发现组织更倾向于资助中等新颖性的项目，并探讨了评审小组的工作量、专业多样性和与申请者的共享位置如何影响对新颖性的偏好。
Building on a unique, multi-source, and multi-method study of R&D projects in a leading professional services firm, we develop the argument that organizations are more likely to fund projects with intermediate levels of novelty. That is, some project novelty increases the share of requested funds received, but too much novelty is difficult to appreciate and is selected against. While prior research has considered the characteristics of the individuals generating project ideas, we shift the focus to the panel of selectors and explore how they shape the evaluation of novelty. We theorize that a high panel workload reduces panel preference for novelty in selection, whereas a diversity of panel expertise and a shared location between panel and applicant increase preference for novelty. We explore the implications of these findings for theories of innovation search, organizational selection, and managerial practice.