A simple status quo that ensures participation (with application to efficient bargaining)
研究了在贝叶斯激励相容机制中，当类型独立且满足某种“一致性”时，以均衡分配相同分布的随机分配作为现状可满足参与约束；若效用为凸，则可用确定性期望均衡分配。对拟线性情形，这意味着当总剩余关于决策为凸时，以期望有效决策为现状可实现有效谈判。
We consider Bayesian incentive-compatible mechanisms with independent types and either private values or interdependent values that satisfy a form of "congruence." We show that in these settings, interim participation constraints are satisfied when the status quo is the randomized allocation that has the same distribution as the equilibrium allocation in the mechanism. Moreover, when utilities are convex in the allocation, we can instead satisfy participation constraints with the deterministic status quo equal to the expected equilibrium allocation in the mechanism. For quasilinear settings, these observations imply the possibility of efficient bargaining when the status quo specifies the expected efficient decision provided that the total surplus is convex in the decision.