The monopsonistic player labour market in a win‐maximising league
研究了在赢利最大化假设下，职业体育联盟中球员市场因保留和转会制度形成的买方垄断，发现与利润最大化联盟相比，赢利最大化联盟对球员的需求和薪资更高，球员未被剥削反而被高估。
In this paper the monopsonistic player labour market in professional team sports, created by player market regulations such as a retain and transfer system, is analysed under the hypothesis that clubs are win‐maximisers. It is shown that in a win‐maximising sports league, demand for playing talent and salary level are higher than in a profit‐maximising league. It can also be shown that under win‐maximisation, as opposed to profit‐maximisation, players are not exploited but rather overpaid by a non‐discriminating monopsonist.