The Pension-Augmented Balance Sheet
利用大型制造业企业的面板数据，研究发现盈利差且养老金资金不足的企业会低估其负债，且企业会根据税盾和养老金看跌期权的价值来管理养老金，表明养老金管理并非完全中立，养老金担保公司面临逆向选择风险。
The proposition that assets and liabilities are effectively part of firms' balance sheets is examined using a detailed panel data set of large manufacturing firms. Firms with poor profitability and with underfunded pensions are found to undervalue their liabilities relative to revaluations based on a common discount rate. Moreover, firms are found to fund their pensions in a way that takes into account the values of the tax shield and pension put. These findings indicate that pensions are not managed in a disinterested way, solely on behalf of their beneficiaries, and that the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation is exposed to adverse selection.