Optimal CEO Compensation with Search: Theory and Empirical Evidence
将代理问题融入搜寻理论，研究市场均衡中的CEO薪酬，发现最优薪酬绩效比小于1，且其敏感性正向取决于公司特有风险、负向取决于系统性风险，并用数据验证。
ABSTRACT We integrate an agency problem into search theory to study executive compensation in a market equilibrium. A CEO can choose to stay or quit and search after privately observing an idiosyncratic shock to the firm. The market equilibrium endogenizes CEOs’ and firms’ outside options and captures contracting externalities. We show that the optimal pay‐to‐performance ratio is less than one even when the CEO is risk neutral. Moreover, the equilibrium pay‐to‐performance sensitivity depends positively on a firm's idiosyncratic risk and negatively on the systematic risk. Our empirical tests using executive compensation data confirm these results.