An Experimental Study of Managerial Pay and Firm Hedging Decisions
通过实验检验薪酬函数形状对管理者风险承担的影响，发现凸性薪酬激励更多风险行为，但个体差异大且受决策情境影响，如将对冲称为保险会增强风险规避。
A manager's pay is often a function of a performance measure such as revenue, profit, or asset value. This study tests directly by experimentation the implications of pay function shape and managerial risk taking. Greater convexity of pay functions motivated greater risk taking, but not to the extent predicted and with great variability, individually and across managers. Decisions by managers about the level of firm risk were found to be significantly context dependent, in that simply referring to a hedging decision as insuring motivated greater risk avoidance. Managers were also more likely to take greater risks when pay was expected to fall.