Employee Selection as a Control System
研究了当难以通过合同激励员工时，通过选拔偏好与组织目标一致的员工来替代激励的效果。利用金融机构数据发现，通过特定渠道选拔的员工更可能使用决策权且风险更低，表明员工选拔是组织控制的重要但被忽视的要素。
ABSTRACT Theories from the economics, management control, and organizational behavior literatures predict that when it is difficult to align incentives by contracting on output, aligning preferences via employee selection may provide a useful alternative. This study investigates this idea empirically using personnel and lending data from a financial services organization that implemented a highly decentralized business model. I exploit variation in this organization in whether or not employees are selected via channels that are likely to sort on the alignment of their preferences with organizational objectives. I find that employees selected through such channels are more likely to use decision‐making authority in the granting and structuring of consumer loans than those who are not. Conditional on using decision‐making authority, their decisions are also less risky ex post. These findings demonstrate employee selection as an important, but understudied, element of organizational control systems.