Strategic obfuscation of production capacities
研究两个竞争性生产商与一个零售商组成的供应链中，生产商通过策略性定价模糊自身产能以提升利润的行为，发现模糊化能促进隐性合谋并提高批发价，但损害零售商和整体渠道利润。
Recent supply-chain models that study competition among capacity-constrained producers omit the possibility of producers strategically setting wholesale prices to create uncertainty with regards to (i.e., to obfuscate) their production capacities. To shed some light on this possibility, we study strategic obfuscation in a supply-chain model comprised of two competing producers and a retailer, where one of the producers faces a privately-known capacity constraint. We show that capacity obfuscation can strictly increase the obfuscating producer's profit, therefore, presenting a clear incentive for such practices. Moreover, we identify conditions under which both producers' profits increase. In effect, obfuscation enables producers to tacitly collude and charge higher wholesale prices by moderating competition between producers. The retailer, in contrast, suffers a loss in profit, raises retail prices, while overall channel profits decrease. We show that the extent of capacity obfuscation is limited by its cost and by a strategic retailer's incentive to facilitate a deterrence. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 61: 244–267, 2014