How Do Powerful CEOs Affect Analyst Coverage?
研究了CEO权力如何影响分析师跟踪数量，发现强势CEO的公司分析师覆盖更少，因为CEO更透明，减少了信息不对称，从而降低了对分析师报告的需求。
Abstract We examine how CEO power affects the extent of analyst coverage. CEO power can influence a CEO's incentives to disclose information. The amount of information disclosed by the CEO in turn influences the information environment, which affects financial analysts’ incentives to follow the firm. Consistent with this notion, we show that firms with powerful CEOs are covered by fewer analysts. In addition, the evidence shows that firms with more powerful CEOs experience less information asymmetry. Powerful CEOs are well insulated and have fewer incentives to conceal information, resulting in more transparency. The information provided to investors directly by the firm substitutes for the information in the analyst's report. As a result, the demand for analyst coverage is lower. Our results are important because they show that CEO power affects important corporate outcomes such as corporate transparency and analyst following .