Will Regulatory Enforcement and Principles Versus Rules-Based Accounting Influence Auditors' Judgments to Constrain Aggressive Reporting?
通过实验研究97名审计师，发现强监管下原则导向会计准则比规则导向更能约束激进报告，且原则导向整体导致更保守的报告。
With the movement towards consideration of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in the U.S., a question arises as to whether the adoption of a principles-based approach such as the IFRS will ultimately result in higher quality financial reporting. This issue is particularly relevant as the SEC and the securities markets ponder the implications of a decision that may lead to the ultimate adoption of, or convergence with, IFRS in the U.S. To examine this issue, we employ an experimental approach with 97 experienced auditors as participants. Using a case setting involving the classification of a lease (operating vs. capital), we manipulate the accounting standard as rules-based or principles-based and the regulatory enforcement regime as strong or weak. The lease setting is one where there are indications of management aggressive reporting with the transaction structured to just comply with accounting rules and with incentives to leave the debt off of the Balance Sheet. We find that in a strong regulatory enforcement regime, auditors are more likely to constrain aggressive reporting under principles-based accounting standards than under rules-based accounting standards. We also provide exploratory findings indicating that auditors’ judgments under principles-based standards, regardless of the strength of regulatory enforcement, will lead to more conservative reporting when compared with a rules-based regime coupled with strong regulatory enforcement, indicative of the current reporting setting in the U.S. The implications of the findings for research and public policy are presented.