THE DISCIPLINARY ROLE OF FAILED TAKEOVER ATTEMPTS
研究发现，失败收购尝试后目标公司CEO更替率比匹配的非目标公司高21%，且与股票回报负相关；目标公司更可能启动重组，重组后CEO更替减少，否则外部大股东会介入推动更替，表明失败收购有惩戒作用。
Abstract I find that the CEO turnover in target firms following failed takeover attempts is 21% greater than matched nontarget firms and negatively correlated with stock returns both before and during the attempt. Target firms are 14% more likely than matched nontarget firms to initiate corporate restructurings during the failed attempt. Restructured firms have more positive stock returns during this period and are less likely to experience subsequent CEO turnover. When restructurings do not occur, active outside blockholders are more likely to emerge and facilitate CEO turnover. These findings indicate that failed takeover attempts can play a disciplinary role.