Welfare Effects of Endogenous Information Acquisition and Disclosure in Duopoly Markets
研究了需求不确定下双寡头企业内生信息获取与披露的互动，发现强制披露可能降低信息精度，反而减少社会福利。
This paper investigates the interaction between firms' information acquisition decisions and disclosure of internally acquired information in a Cournot duopoly market under demand uncertainty. The main results are as follows. When the correlation between firms' demands is positive and sufficiently high, disclosure of information on demand uncertainty can enhance social welfare, given that the quality of firms' private information is constant. However, in the setting where firms' private information is endogenously determined, mandatory disclosure is not always desirable. This is because, when disclosure is mandated, firms acquire less precise information compared with the case where the acquired information is not disclosed; hence, their internal information environments are deteriorated. This can lead to unintended consequences such that disclosure regulation decreases social welfare.