Regulation of Federal Contractors' Employment Patterns
研究了美国社会监管（如雇佣模式、消费者保护）的波动性，指出其因置于行政部门而非独立机构而受总统态度影响，支持时成效显著，反对时则可能遭受重创。
During the last quarter century, regulation of employment patterns, consumer protection, environmental protection, and worker safety intensified rapidly, followed by a period of steep de-emphasis. Some of this volatility resulted from the placement of these forms of social regulation directly within the executive branch of the United States government, rather than, as had previously been the case, with agencies that were independent from the three principal branches of government. Under these relatively new forms of social regulation, when a President supports an agency's regulatory mission, extraordinary gains are likely to ensue. However, setbacks can be devastating when a President does not favor a program.