放松管制与法院

Deregulation and the Courts

Journal of Policy Analysis and Management · 1986
被引 6
ABS 3

中文导读

本文探讨法院在放松管制运动中的角色,认为法院不应一味顺从放松管制,而应通过司法审查确保其符合法律并防止政治强势集团的不当影响。

Abstract

The recent deregulation movement has occupied not only executive agencies and Congress, but the courts as well. Legal challenges to deregulatory measures press traditional doctrines governing judicial review; the traditional role of the courts has been to fend off rather than to help bring about government regulation. These traditions, when joined with contemporary distrust of both regulation and the courts, account for a Abstract mounting belief that courts should take a deferential approach to deregulation. But such an approach would be misguided in light of the importance of judicial review in promoting agency adherence to statutes enacted by Congress and in guarding against factional influences over government. Judge-made doctrines can be developed to make it more likely that deregulation is consistent with law and does not reflect the disproportionate influence of politically powerful groups.

放松管制法律经济学政治学经济学司法审查