Market Reactions to Differentially Available Information in the Laboratory
通过实验室实验检验信息可获得性差异是否影响市场价格，发现不利信息传播范围越小，价格反而越高，这对监管有启示。
This paper examines whether differential availability of information affects prices in laboratory markets. Specifically, we test whether market prices increase when unfavorable information is made less widely available. Our results have regulatory implications to the extent that where information is presented alters its distribution among investors. For example, earnings numbers are more widely reported than other annual report details, and not all investors have the ability or incentive to analyze other annual report information. Therefore, it is plausible that earnings information is available to and processed by more investors than the information contained in other portions of annual reports. Beaver [1981] defines a market as signal-efficient with respect to some signal if the market price is the same when only some investors hold that signal as it would be if all investors held it. If financial markets are signalefficient, then making a disclosure available to more investors would have no price effect. However, if markets react less strongly to information that is held by fewer investors, and if nonearnings information is in fact available to fewer investors, then share prices will be affected by whether a