Do CEOS Encounter Within-Tenure Settling Up? A Multiperiod Perspective on Executive Pay and Dismissal
研究了CEO的过往业绩和薪酬历史如何影响当前薪酬和解雇概率，发现部分历史记录会纠正之前的薪酬偏差，而另一些则加剧不平等。
We consider a central puzzle surrounding CEO accountability: What explains the payoffs and penalties that CEOs receive? Invoking Fama's concept of "settling up," we examine how a CEO's entire performance record and history of prior over- or underpayment affect current pay and the odds of dismissal. We find that some parts of a CEO's historical track record work to remedy prior over- or underpayment, whereas other aspects result in greater imbalances, as rich CEOs get richer while poorer ones get poorer. History matters when boards reward or punish their CEOs, but such reckoning is relatively complex.