Public Disclosure and the Structure of Private Information Markets
研究私人信息市场结构如何影响投资者对公开披露的需求，发现公开披露的价值随私人信息市场结构变化，企业选择性私下披露可改善交易者福利，与管理盈利预测的实证观察一致。
This study investigates the relationship between private information markets and the disclosure policies of publicly traded firms.1 The main point of the paper is that the structure of private information markets is crucial in determining investor demand for information disclosures. The value of public disclosure to traders is shown to vary dramatically with the structure of the private information market. It is also demonstrated that if firms are given the power to alter the structure of the private information market through selective private disclosures of information before any public release, traders may be made better off. These results are consistent with empirical observations regarding the public release of management earnings forecasts. It is observed that firms may privately inform securities analysts of earnings forecasts before public release (if any), apparently influencing the structure of the private information market. In the mid 1970s, the SEC, in response to this practice, attempted to mandate forecast disclosures. But this SEC action was strongly op-