Private Interaction Between Firm Management and Sell‐Side Analysts
利用一家纽交所大公司的内部记录，研究了哪些分析师会私下接触管理层、何时接触以及原因，并与公开电话会议互动对比，发现私下互动是分析师获取信息的重要渠道，但并非为了公司特定的预测信息。
ABSTRACT Although sell‐side analysts often privately interact with managers of publicly traded firms, the private nature of this contact has historically obscured direction examination. By examining a set of proprietary records compiled by a large‐cap NYSE‐traded firm, I offer insights into which analysts privately meet with management, when analysts privately interact with management, and why these interactions occur. I also compare private interaction to public interaction between analysts and managers on conference calls. The evidence suggests that private interaction with management is an important communication channel for analysts for reasons other than firm‐specific forecasting news.