Threat of entry, asymmetric information, and pricing
研究信息不对称如何影响在位企业在面临进入威胁时采取限制性定价，发现当潜在进入者来自行业外或在位企业参与研发联盟时，信息不对称会促使在位企业提前用价格应对进入，美国有线电视行业数据支持这一结论。
Abstract This paper examines the impact of asymmetric information on incumbent firms' propensity to engage in limit pricing when faced with threat of entry. I draw from information economics to argue that incumbents will use price to respond ex ante to entry in situations characterized by asymmetric information. I suggest two situations in which asymmetric information can arise: when potential entrants are from outside the primary industry and when incumbent firms are members of R&D consortia. I then study pricing in the U.S. cable TV industry to show that pricing patterns of incumbent cable TV systems are consistent with limit pricing when the relationship between the incumbent and potential entrant is characterized by asymmetric information. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.