Signaling and Monitoring in Public-Sector Accounting
构建了公共部门财务报告中信号传递与监督的正式模型，并用城市参与政府财务官员协会认证项目的数据进行检验，发现信号模型得到支持而监督模型未获证实。
Although several recent papers (e.g., Zimmerman [1977], Baber [1983], Evans and Patton [1983], and Ingram [1984]) have hypothesized that state and local government accounting and auditing practices will depend on the severity of the information asymmetries in each setting, mixed empirical results have been obtained. Since monitoring and signaling are the primary mechanisms which have been invoked to explain how accounting and auditing reduce information asymmetries, in this paper we begin by developing formal models of the monitoring and signaling demands for public-sector financial reporting. We then test these models empirically using quality of financial reporting (as indicated by a city's participation in the Government Finance Officers Association Certificate of Conformance Program, CCP) as the dependent variable. We find that observed CCP participation is consistent with predictions from the signaling model, but that the monitoring model's predictions are generally not supported. In section 2 we develop the signaling and monitoring models. In section 3 we empirically test hypotheses from both models as well as some other signalingand monitoring-based hypotheses which have been developed