源于委托-代理二元关系而非由其定义的官僚政治

Bureaucratic Politics Arising From, Not Defined by, a Principal-Agency Dyad

Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory · 2014
被引 23
ABS 4

中文导读

对比了委托代理理论中两种研究模式:将机构视为整体的聚合模式与关注个体的分解模式,指出后者机制清晰可验证,但面临如何将二元绩效累积为更大机构结构的挑战。

Abstract

We contrast two archetypal modes of research in principal-agency theory and in public administration: an aggregated mode which regards the agency as a unified whole, and a disaggregated mode attending to individuals. We argue for the virtues of the latter approach in that mechanisms are clear, verifiable, and specific. The aggregated approach may also be clear, at the cost of submerging internal conflicts while yielding powerful understandings of the cumulative performance of the agency. The challenge to those of us who advocate the individual, behavioral approach is to identify how to accumulate dyadic performance into larger structures of agency itself.

公共管理政治学委托代理理论官僚制