Motivation, Discretion, and Corruption
研究发现，增加监督、提高工资和减少自由裁量权等传统反腐手段可能适得其反，而外在动机（如绩效薪酬）和内在动机（如公共服务动机）均与腐败倾向负相关，且与民间组织接触多的官员更廉洁，与媒体接触多的官员则相反。
Increased monitoring, higher wages, and less discretion are some of the generic remedies for corruption. However, these remedies can be expensive, and may reduce bureaucrats' public service effort and increase corruption. A theoretical model shows that extrinsic motivation for public service (e.g., performance pay) can reduce corruption without some of these side effects. Using a unique survey on 800 central government bureaucrats in Korea, this article also provides individual-level micro evidence that is largely consistent with the predictions of the theoretical model. Interestingly, the evidence suggests that bureaucrats' intrinsic motivation (e.g., public service motivation) is as negatively associated with their corruptibility as extrinsic motivation. Also, bureaucrats' frequent contact with civil organizations is negatively associated with their corruptibility, whereas frequent contact with the media is positively correlated with corruptibility.