A Public Choice Approach to Motivating People in Bureaucratic Organizations
从公共选择视角，基于个人目标、自由裁量权和偏好等假设，推导出管理者如何通过改变激励制度、工作小组规模、工作设计和人员轮换来提高生产率，对公共部门管理者有参考价值。
This paper examines the problem of motivating people in organizations from a public choice viewpoint. A number of propositions are derived deductively from assumptions regarding individual goals, discretion, and preferences. These suggest how managers can improve productivity by changing either incentive systems or work group size, job design, and personnel rotation practices. Public choice is the application of economic analysis to the study of political behavior. Within public administration, public choice has formed a theoretical basis for a critique of government bureaucracy and for an examination of market and quasi-market mechanisms for the delivery of public services, including privatization, voucher schemes, contracting out, and competing bureaucracies. This growing body of research has been reviewed by Straussman (1981) and Weschler (1982). Little attempt, however, has been made to apply public choice methodology to the problems facing those who must manage people in large bureaucratic organizations. This is surprising because a central concern of public choice focuses on how rational individuals cooperate to