Collusion and Noncontrollable Cost Allocation
研究企业为何将非可控成本（如固定成本）分配给部门，尽管这与责任会计原则相悖，并提供了一个基于合谋视角的解释。
Controllability is often alleged to be an important consideration in constructing a managerial accounting system for performance evaluation. Practically all cost accounting textbooks recommend that a manager's evaluation should be confined to performance aspects that he can directly influence in the time period under consideration.' In contrast to this recommendation, however, firms allocate fixed and other joint costs to various departments, even though such costs are apparently not controllable by department heads. For example, Reece and Cool indicated that 40% of 594 surveyed companies calculated income the same way for both internal decision and control purposes and for external reporting purposes, and more than half of the remaining 60% also allocated corporate administrative expenses to calculate income for managerial purposes.2 Not much is known about why companies continue to allocate those seemingly noncontrollable costs for internal decision and control purposes, even though such allocations are apparently inconsistent with the concept of responsibility accounting.3 This study provides one possible