INVESTMENT BANKS IN DUAL ROLES: ACQUIRER M&A ADVISORS AS UNDERWRITERS
研究了投资银行同时担任收购方并购顾问和融资证券承销商的双重角色，发现该角色与收购方公告回报降低、目标方回报提高、收购溢价增加、完成速度加快和剥离率上升相关，但未导致承销费用降低。
Abstract We analyze the dual role of investment banks that provide advice to acquiring firms and act as underwriters on the securities issued to finance the acquisition. We find that the dual role of acquirer advisors is associated with lower acquirer announcement returns, higher target announcement returns, higher acquisition premiums, faster completion speeds, and higher divestiture rates. The dual role of the acquirer advisor does not lead to lower underwriting fees or issue costs. Our results are robust to controlling for the endogeneity of selection of the acquirer advisor as underwriter on the security issue used to finance the acquisition.