The Administrative World of Chadha and Bowsher
本文分析美国最高法院在查德哈案和鲍舍案中关于权力分立的判决，指出其推动行政权力集中于总统的趋势，但违背了分散权力和制衡的传统，对国会、独立机构等产生不利影响。
In two decisions over a three-year period, the Supreme Court has written with very broad strokes on the question of separation of powers. INS v. Chadha (1983) struck down a 50-year experiment with the legislative veto. Three years later, in Bowsher v. Synar, the Court declared unconstitutional a key feature of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act. In both decisions, the Court presented a highly formalistic model of the relationship between Congress and the President. These decisions have stirred hope in some quarters that the time has come to place all executive and administrative responsibilities directly under the President. At stake, then, is the customary role of Congress to supervise the work of executive agencies. Also at risk is the status of the General Accounting Office, the independent regulatory commissions, the Federal Reserve Board, and the U.S. Archivist. In these decisions, the Supreme Court has encouraged a structural revamping that will not serve the interest of Congress, the agencies, or government generally. Efforts to concentrate all executive powers in the presidency, producing a neat hierarchical model to rival the military, will fail because they run counter to a long tradition of spreading power and instituting checks. In any event, the decisions make it necessary to rethink basic principles and understand why some administrative structures and controls are placed outside the control of the President.