Determinants and Effects of Corporate Lobbying
研究了企业游说的决定因素及其对公司价值的影响，发现政策利好大的企业游说更积极，且股东重视管理层的游说活动，尤其当企业没有政治行动委员会时。
We examine the determinants and value effects of corporate lobbying, controlling for corporate political action committee (PAC) campaign contributions. We find evidence that firms with greater potential payoffs from favorable policy and regulations lobby most actively, and that managers often utilize both lobbying and campaign contribution channels to influence the political climate affecting the firm. We also find that shareholders value the lobbying activities pursued by management on their behalf, particularly if the firm does not have a PAC that contributed to an election campaign. The results are robust to a number of tests designed to mitigate potential omitted‐variable and self‐selection bias.