Disclosure Policies with Multiple Users
研究当公司有披露内容自由裁量权且偏离真实披露的成本内生时，多个目标冲突的用户如何影响公司披露的信息含量。模型涉及在位企业、潜在进入者和股东三方互动，对理解企业信息披露策略有参考价值。
In this paper, we examine how the presence of multiple users with conflicting objectives affects the informativeness of a firm's disclosures when the firm has discretion over disclosure content, and the costs of deviating from truthful disclosures are endogenous. We consider interactions among three parties: an Incumbent, an Entrant, and a representative stockholder. The Incumbent, which represents a public firm, privately observes some valuation-relevant information, which we refer to as the Incumbent's type. Since the firm is publicly held, the Incumbent can communicate its type only via a public disclosure. After making this disclosure, the Incumbent distributes its profits to the stockholder as a terminal (liquidating) dividend that depends on its type and on the Entrant's action. The Entrant is a potential competitor who will enter if the Incumbent's information appears favorable relative to the cost of entry. Entry represents increased competition in the Incumbent's product market and therefore decreases the terminal dividend. The stockholder