Voting Power Indices and the Setting of Financial Accounting Standards: Extensions
扩展了投票权力指数在财务会计准则制定中的应用，检验了Metcalf报告关于特殊利益集团控制准则制定的说法，发现没有证据表明八大会计师事务所控制FASB，但分析了其潜在控制可能性及假设条件的影响。
The allegations and conclusions of the Metcalf report (U.S. Senate [1977]) motivated attempts to explain or refute the notion that the setting of financial accounting standards is controlled by special interest groups (Haring [1979], Hussein and Ketz [1980], Patton [1980], and Newman [1981a; 1981b]). Given the assumptions of the voting model tested in each case, the results suggest no apparent control of the Financial Accounting Standards Board by the so-called accounting establishmentBig public accounting firms and their clients. Each of these studies examined the past voting behavior of accounting policy bodies and tested hypotheses regarding certain sorts of coalition formation, primarily coalitions of public accountants from Big Eight firms. Even though there was no evidence of control by the Big Eight, Newman [1981a] argued that the Big Eight still had the potential to control the FASB. His argument was supported by a priori calculations of real voting power indices of a possible bloc of FASB representatives drawn from these largest public accounting firms. Newman's calculations rest on three forms of critical assumptions underlying the application of a priori real voting power indices to actual voting situations. These assumptions affect the outcomes and the relevance of voting power indices for such analyses. The objectives of this