Backward-Looking Social Control
放松了理性选择理论的前瞻性假设，通过计算机模拟检验后顾型实用主义者中社会控制的演化，发现外部道德制裁导致合作不足，而内化制裁导致过度合作。
Rational-choice theorists stress the need for social control to overcome the free-rider problem in collective action. Critics counter that mechanisms for monitoring and enforcement are themselves public goods that presume collective action rather than explain it. In response Heckathorn (1989) proposed an analytic solution based on « hypocritical cooperation » in which rational actors calculate the optimal allocation of resources between compliance with collective obligations and their enforcement. I relax these « forward-looking » behavioral assumptions and show how social control might evolve among « backward-looking » pragmatists. Computers simulations test the ability of various sanctioning regimes to generate cooperation as well as resist stampedes that risk overcooperation and needless sacrifice. External moral sanctions produce too little cooperation, while internalized sanctions produce too much.