Balancing supply and demand under bilateral constraints
研究无货币市场中，在双边连接约束下，具有单峰偏好的同质商品如何在供应商和需求者之间重新分配，提出一种公平分配规则并证明其激励相容性。
<p>In a moneyless market, a nondisposable homogeneous commodity is reallocated between agents with single-peaked preferences. Agents are either suppliers or demanders. Transfers between a supplier and a demander are feasible only if they are linked. The links form an arbitrary bipartite graph. Typically, supply is short in one segment of the market, while demand is short in another.</p> \n \n<p>Our egalitarian transfer solution generalizes Sprumont's (1991) and Klaus et al.'s (1998) uniform allocation rules. It rations only the long side in each market segment, equalizing the net transfers of rationed agents as much as permitted by the bilateral constraints. It elicits a truthful report of both preferences and links: removing a feasible link is never profitable to either one of its two agents. Together with efficiency and a version of equal treatment of equals, these properties are characteristic.</p>