An Ecology of Agency Arrangements: Mortality of Savings and Loan Associations, 1960-1987
研究了互助型和股份制储蓄贷款协会的不同代理安排如何影响其生存，发现互助型更易受银行竞争冲击，但环境波动影响不显著，且放松管制削弱了股份制的代理优势。
Hayagreeva Rao Emory University Eric H. Neilsen Case Western Reserve University This paper examines whether organizations with different collectivized agency arrangements have different survival prospects. We propose that the structure of monitoring and incentive systems determines the agency costs of collectivized agencies and, in turn, their vulnerability to competition and environmental variability. The paper focuses on mutual and stock savings and loan associations (SLAs) and notes that stock SLAs have superior monitoring, incentive systems, and capital structures in comparison with mutual SLAs. An analysis of 900 SLAs founded during 1960-1987 indicates that mutual companies were more vulnerable than stock companies to competition from commercial banks, but there was no conclusive evidence that mutuals were more susceptible to environmental variability than stocks were. The results also show that deregulation sharply attenuated the agency advantages of stocks, implying that agency-cost advantages may be constrained by institutional processes.'