Bureaucracy and Efficiency: An Analysis of Taxation in Early Modern Prussia
运用代理理论分析1640-1806年普鲁士税收制度，挑战了其高效源于官僚制的传统观点，发现效率来自对理想官僚制的特定偏离，增强了统治者对税收官员的控制。
We use agency theory to analyze the development of the tax collection system in Prussia between 1640 and 1806. The Prussian tax system was one of the most efficient in early modern Europe. Scholars have argued that (1) the Prussian tax administration was highly bureaucratic, and (2) its efficiency was due primarily to its bureaucratic characteristics. We challenge both propositions. We show that the Prussian tax system deviatedfrom the bureaucratic ideal type in important respects. We then develop general propositions about the conditions under which bureaucratic forms of recruitment, monitoring, and sanctioning are more efficient than alternative forms of agency. We conclude that the efficiency of the Prussian tax collection system was caused by specific deviations from the ideal-typical bureaucracy that increased the ability of rulers to control tax officials.