Interlocking Directorates and Communities of Interest Among American Railroad Companies, 1905
研究了1905年美国铁路公司间所有权与控制权在组织间层面的关系，发现所有权结构与控制结构高度一致，且网络中心性呈现集群而非单一层级。
The debate about the separation of ownership and control has focused primarily on internal control of corporations. This study examines the relationship between ownership and control at the interorganizational level. It investigates the relationship between the structure of interorganizational title, as indicated by proprietary communities of interest, and the structure of interorganizational control, as shown by clusters offirms that recruited their boards from the same sets of directors. Secondarily the paper investigates the structure of centrality in the interlocking directorates, for which managerial theory predicts a close relationship between size and centrality. Examining American railroads in 1905, the results show that (1) while ownership and control may or may not have been separate at the level of the individual firm, at the interorganizational level the structure of title conforms very closely to the structure of control; and (2) the structure of centrality exhibits no singular hierarchy, but distinct clusters. Moreover, major companies were not highly central in the entire network, but were instead dominant within particular clusters, suggesting that centralization does not always engender power. The paper concludes that the debate over ownership and control should focus on both organizational and interorganizational levels.