An Economic Analysis of Retroactive Liability Insurance
通过简化财务模型分析追溯责任保险市场的经济动机和条件，发现联邦所得税为承保提供激励，税收套利使被保险人分享保险人的损失准备金税收扣除，利率、费用和结案时间影响市场发展，但可能存在激励冲突。
Retroactive liability insurance may be written to provide coverage for a known loss that occurred during a past time period. Some simplified financial models are developed in this paper in order to provide some economic insights about the market for this coverage. The financial motives and conditions for the development of this market are analyzed. In particular, federal income taxes provide economic incentives for writing the coverage. Tax arbitrage enables the insured to share the income tax deductions for loss reserves available to an insurer when the coverage is written. Interest rates, insurer expenses. and the expected time to settlement influence the development of the market. Potential incentive conflicts may arise, however.