ON MAJORITARIAN BARGAINING WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION*
研究了有限期版本的Baron-Ferejohn多数议价模型，发现提议者可能故意拖延以获取更好结果，且类型揭示受信号发送和联盟包容双重影响，分离均衡常因拖延不可行或无利可图而不存在。
This article studies a finite horizon version of Baron and Ferejohn's ( American Political Science Review 83 (1989), 1181–206) majoritarian bargaining with incomplete information. Of many findings, we show that (i) allowing for delay can be optimal for a proposer; (ii) the revelation of a type depends on two conflicting concerns, the “offer” concern à la Spence's signaling (the higher the type the better) and the “coalition inclusion” concern in a majority consent (the lower the type the better); and (iii) players take actions to distinguish themselves via delay, but separating equilibria often fail to exist due to incapability or unprofitability of exercising delay.