INTEGRATING MARKET ALTERNATIVES INTO THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF OPTIMAL DETERRENCE
将自愿交易作为犯罪替代选项纳入经济模型，解释了为何最优制裁应随犯罪历史递增以及必要性可作为部分辩护，并表明传统二元选择假设导致了长期争议。
Leading economic models of crime assume that potential criminals achieve their ends by criminal means or not at all. We develop a framework in which potential criminals can also attain their objectives through voluntary trade. Our framework helps explain several features of the legal system that have proven to be problematic for the canonical approach: why optimal sanctions should be increasing in an individual's criminal history, and why necessity may be a partial defense in some situations. Finally, the inclusion of a voluntary trade option makes the maximization of a utilitarian welfare function identical to minimizing the costs of crime, implying that a long‐standing controversy in the literature is, in part, an artifact of the assumption that criminals face a binary choice set.