Wage posting: evidence from job ads
研究了美国、英国和斯洛文尼亚雇主在招聘广告中发布工资的现象，发现雇主在招聘技能工人时更少发布工资，且发布与否与搜索结果关系不大。
Abstract Recent studies of search theory examine how employers use a wage‐setting mechanism – either by bargaining or through the posting of a non‐negotiable wage offer in a job ad – to facilitate search. We contribute to this literature by examining wage posting in job ads in the US, the UK, and Slovenia. Despite considerable differences in the incidence of wage posting, employers in all three markets are less likely to post a wage offer when searching for skilled workers. The decision on whether or not to post a wage offer is only weakly related to the outcomes of employers’ search.