On Freezing Depositor Funds at Financially Distressed Banks: An Experimental Analysis
通过实验评估流动性暂停后还款条款变更及取款行为信息公开对困境银行脆弱性的影响，发现强硬谈判立场能有效促进稳定，但信息公开会削弱其效果。
This article reports an experiment conducted to evaluate the effects of alterations in the terms of repayments to depositors following a liquidity suspension, as well as the effect of alterations in the publicity of information about withdrawal behavior on the fragility of distressed banks. Results indicate that a “tough” renegotiation stance of protecting depositors who maintain their money in the bank, can quite effectively promote stability. Information provided to depositors regarding past withdrawal behavior weakens the effectiveness of a tough renegotiation policy but reduces fragility somewhat for a more lenient rescheduling condition.