STRATEGIC ENFORCEMENT, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, AND CONTRACTUAL R&D
研究了发展中国家合约研发中知识产权的作用，发现强知识产权促使企业专业化于有优势的研发活动，帮助本土企业从模仿转向创新，且跨国公司的战略执法可作为补贴合约研发的有效工具。
This study examines the role of intellectual property rights ( IPRs ) in contractual research and development (R&D) in developing countries. We find that strong IPRs provide incentives for firms, both multinational and local, to specialize in R&D activities in which they have competitive advantage (the specialization effect ). They also facilitate the switching process from imitators to potential innovators for local firms (the switching effect ). Moreover, we also demonstrate that a multinational firm's strategic IPRs enforcement behavior can be an effective instrument for subsidizing contractual R&D in developing countries (the subsidizing effect ). We further illustrate how a policy mix of IPRs and a foreign direct investment subsidy in these countries affects R&D activities by adding an offshore R&D subsidiary as an additional organizational form.